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Addressing Social Loafi ng
on Faculty Committees
Andrea A. Curcio and Mary A. Lynch
“Do all committee work enthusiastically but incompetently; that way your colleagues will say, ‘She 
is really great, but please don’t put her on my committee!’”
—Half-joking advice given to one of us as we entered the academy.
Introduction
Law faculty self-governance occurs largely through faculty committees, 
and that self-governance plays an integral role in academic freedom.1 While 
most law faculty members vigorously defend their right to academic freedom 
and self-governance, for some that defense fails to translate into a willingness 
to fully engage in the committee work necessary to ensure meaningful self-
governance. This is problematic on two fronts. First, by withdrawing from 
governance activities, we participate in the demise of academic freedom—
freedom sustained by faculty activism, agreement and disagreement over 
institutional policies, initiative, and directions.2 Second, the failure of some 
1. See On the Relationship of Faculty Governance to Academic Freedom, in AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, 
POLICY DOCUMENTS AND REPORTS 123 (11th ed. 2015) (discussing how and why faculty 
governance is critical to the maintenance of principles of academic freedom).
2. Mary Burgan, Careers in Academe: Women in the “Pre-Feminist” Generation in the Academy, in OVER 
TEN MILLION SERVED: GENDERED SERVICE IN LANGUAGE AND LITERATURE WORKPLACES 31 
(Michelle A. Massé & Katie J. Hogan eds., 2010) [hereinafter OVER TEN MILLION SERVED] 
(noting that academic freedom requires active debate about institutional policy issues and 
initiatives).
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to do their fair share of committee work creates workload equity and social 
responsibility problems.3
Because faculty self-governance is integral to the eff ective functioning of 
law schools, and because that self-governance requires productive committees, 
the “reward” for effi  cient and strong faculty service work performance is 
often more service work.4 The opposite is also true. Faculty members who 
demonstrate lack of competence or responsibility when engaging in committee 
work are not called upon to serve. How this plays out in our experience, and 
that of our colleagues at other law schools, is that some faculty members do 
signifi cantly more than others when it comes to the labor necessary to sustain 
and build their institutions.
The tendency of some to sit back and let others do the work when working 
in groups such as committees has a name: “social loafi ng.” Often called the 
“free-rider” problem,5 social loafi ng can lead to inequitable workloads, and, 
according to social cognition theorists, unchecked social loafi ng can have a 
spillover eff ect on those who do carry their fair share of the workload, as well 
as on those who traditionally pick up the slack for the loafers.6
We suspect that social loafi ng is a well-recognized, if unnamed, phenomenon 
at many law schools. This phenomenon is particularly vexing because it 
has tangible career consequences. While the institution benefi ts from both 
committee workers and productive scholars, fi nancial, institutional, and career 
rewards rest largely on scholarly productivity. Socially responsible faculty 
members who fully engage in committee work help sustain a robust system of 
faculty governance. However, they do so at the expense of time available for 
their own scholarly pursuits. By ensuring the work gets done, they also provide 
some colleagues the freedom to disengage and focus on individual career-
enhancing scholarly endeavors with no penalty and potentially signifi cant 
individual rewards. This can create signifi cant institutional inequities. The 
3. See Amir Erez et al., Eff ects of Rotated Leadership and Peer Evaluation on the Functioning and Eff ectiveness 
of Self-Managed Teams: A Quasi-Experiment, 55 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 929, 931 (2002) (noting 
that “doing a fair share of the team’s work maintains equity norms, social responsibility 
norms, and norms of reciprocity”). See also Cassandra M. Guarino & Victor M.H. Borden, 
Faculty Service Loads and Gender: Are Women Taking Care of the Academic Family?, RES. HIGHER EDUC. 
(forthcoming) (fi nding that female faculty perform signifi cantly more internal service than 
their male counterparts and noting that this fi nding raises equity issues in terms of salary 
diff erentials and overall success in academia).
4. Nancy B. Rappaport, “Venn” and the Art of Shared Governance, 35 U. TOL. L. REV. 169, 179 n.43 
(2003). See also Phyllis van Slyck, Welcome to the Land of Super-Service, A Survivor’s Guide . . . and 
Some Questions, in OVER TEN MILLION SERVED, supra note 2, at 195, 202 (noting that faculty 
who perform extraordinary service without complaint are often “rewarded” by being given 
additional administrative work).
5. The terms free-riding and social loafi ng are both used to describe situations in which one or 
more group members fails to do their fair share of the work. Barbara Maiden & Bob Perry, 
Dealing with Free-Riders in Assessed Group Work: Results from a Study at a UK University, 36 ASSESSMENT 
& EVALUATION HIGHER EDUC. 451, 452 (2011). 
6. See infra text and accompanying notes 36–39 (discussing social loafi ng studies).
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question is what to do about it. That question is all the more pressing given 
ongoing changes to the existing legal education model that require signifi cant 
faculty input and committee work in an era when many schools have seen a 
reduction in full-time faculty available to do that work.7
In this article, we suggest that rather than conceding important decision-
making to administrators or perpetuating a potentially unsustainable model 
of disparate service workload allocations, law schools need to explore ways to 
equitably allocate and encourage institutional service work.8 This is especially 
important because sustained workload inequities, along with a system that 
neither rewards extraordinary work nor penalizes substandard work, can 
induce what is known as “the sucker eff ect.” In other words, it can lead those 
who have traditionally carried the lion’s share of the work to reduce the 
injustice of the situation by reducing their own level of eff ort.9 
One way to address the problem of inequitable committee workload 
contributions is to learn from the social cognition literature on social 
loafi ng. That literature addresses the causes of, and solutions to, inequitable 
group work contributions. Studies suggest that making group members’ 
contributions visible and evaluable, via small committee size and committee 
work evaluations, reduces social loafi ng.10 This article discusses both of those 
ideas and particularly looks at using committee work contribution evaluations 
to highlight communal responsibilities, set clear expectations, communicate 
that certain behaviors are valued and important, and motivate change by 
setting normative standards for committee work participation.11 It also suggests 
another way to address workload inequities: rewarding committee workhorses 
with release time from committee work.
7. See infra Part I. See also Andi Curcio, The Potential Adjunctifi cation of Law School Faculties. A PLACE TO 
DISCUSS BEST PRACTICIES FOR LEGAL EDUCATION (May 17, 2017) https://bestpracticeslegaled.
albanylawblogs.org/2017/05/17/the-potential-adjunctification-of-law-school-faculties/ 
[https://perma.cc/E2KK-MW84].
8. Service work extends far beyond work on faculty committees. In this article, we focus mainly 
on solutions to dilemmas created by the current distribution of faculty committee work. 
However, we believe that the big-picture issues of what counts as service and how that work 
should be evaluated and credited deserves serious study. For a discussion of various types of 
service and a general framework for evaluating service contributions, see Jeanette Clausen, 
Rewarding Work: Integrating Service into an Institutional Framework on Faculty Roles and Rewards, in OVER 
TEN MILLION SERVED, supra note 2, at 231, 238–39. In this piece, we focus exclusively on 
inequities resulting from faculty committee service workloads. We recognize other inequities, 
such as teaching load and status, also exist and should be addressed. A discussion of those 
inequities is beyond the scope of this essay.
9. Mel E. Schnake, Equity in Eff ort: The “Sucker Eff ect” in Co-Acting Groups, 17 J. MGMT. 41, 42 (1991) 
(describing studies of the “sucker eff ect,” i.e., the phenomenon in which an individual 
refuses to be played for a “sucker” and thus withholds eff ort when he or she believes other 
capable groups members are consciously withholding eff ort).
10.  For a discussion of these studies, see infra Part IIB.
11. Peter G. Dominick et al., The Eff ects of Peer Feedback on Team Member Behavior, 22 GROUP & ORG. 
MGMT 508, 514–15 (1997) (noting that peer evaluations of group work contributions serve 
these purposes).
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Part I discusses changes in legal education that likely will result in the need 
for more committee work as well as fewer full-time faculty available to do the 
work. It suggests that these changes will require a shift in the current laissez-
faire approach taken with those faculty members who choose not to participate 
fully in committee work. Part II reviews the social cognition theory literature 
and, based on that literature, proposes two potential ways to mitigate social 
loafi ng on faculty committees: smaller committees and evaluation of committee 
work contributions. To help faculties envision what an evaluative instrument 
might look like, we provide a sample rubric in Appendix A. Part III suggests 
rewards for extraordinary committee work, including committee release time. 
It suggests that service work release time does not aff ect budgets and helps 
level the playing fi eld, ensuring those who provide extraordinary institutional 
service also have time to engage more fully in the scholarly endeavors that 
typically result in fi nancial and reputational rewards. In conclusion, the article 
notes that the legal academy is at a critical juncture that necessitates examining 
alternatives to the current committee workload allocation model to preserve 
our system of faculty governance and allow our institutions to thrive.
I. Addressing Faculty Members’ Committee Work Performance: 
Why Now?
Faculty participation in the direction of the law school is among the 
privileges, duties, and rights associated with academic freedom and faculty 
governance.12 Faculty members play critical roles in defi ning and implementing 
institutional missions, strategic planning, curriculum, and numerous other 
decisions that aff ect the school’s direction and educational focus. Most of this 
work is done via committees and task forces. 
As legal education models change, most schools are experiencing an increase 
in faculty committee work responsibilities. Market forces are putting pressure 
on law schools to design, revise, innovate, create, and assess learning and to 
focus on the competencies students need to be successful in a changing legal 
services industry. Additionally, declining enrollment13 and the restructuring of 
12. Faculty governance is written into the ABA and AALS accreditation standards. See, e.g., 
SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, AM. BAR. ASS’N, ABA STANDARDS 
AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS, 2016-2017 Standards 201(a), at 9; 
315, at 23; 404(a), at 28 (2016) [HEREINAFTER ABA STANDARDS]; ASS’N OF AM. LAW SCHS, 2016 
AALS HANDBOOK Bylaws, § 6.4(c), 6.5(a), at 57–58 (2016).
13. Mary Lynch, Plummeting Admissions Numbers Decrease Cost of Clinical Courses Relative to Other 
Courses, BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL EDUC. (Feb. 22, 2013), http://bestpracticeslegaled.
albanylawblogs.org/2013/02/22/plummeting-admissions-numbers-decrease-cost-of-clinical-
courses-relative-to-other-courses/ [https://perma.cc/JJ7F-NSN3]. First year law school 
enrollment rapidly decreased starting in the 2011–12 through the 2012–2013 academic years. 
See SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, AM. BAR. ASS’N, ENROLLMENT AND 
DEGREES AWARDED 1963 TO 2012, ACADEMIC YEARS, https://www.americanbar.org/content/
dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admissions_to_the_bar/statistics/
enrollment_degrees_awarded.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/88J9-N6QN] (last 
visited May 26, 2017) Reports from 2014 through 2015 continued to show sharp decreases in 
1L enrollment with a fl attening out in 2016. See SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. AND ADMISSIONS TO 
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the global market for lawyer/legal services14 have led law schools to explore 
additional revenue sources and new ways to serve the public, including 
LL.M. programs, post-J.D. certifi cates, a one-year master’s program, two-year 
accelerated J.D., online classes and programs, and various other examples 
of outreach and innovations. As law schools develop and market new 
opportunities, faculty governance imperatives require faculty involvement, 
resulting in rapidly expanding faculty committee responsibilities.
When law schools innovate, reorganize, and evolve, faculty have two 
choices: continue a model of self-governance in which the faculty remains 
heavily involved in infl uencing, implementing, and assessing adaptations to 
their schools’ educational programming model, or cede these decisions to law 
school and university administrators. Even if faculties choose the latter course, 
accreditation standards still require signifi cant faculty involvement in many 
institutional decisions.15
For example, recently revised American Bar Association accreditation 
Standard 315 requires that the dean and the faculty “conduct ongoing evaluation 
of the law school’s program of legal education, learning outcomes, and 
assessment methods” 16 and “use the results of this evaluation to determine the 
degree of student attainment of competency in the learning outcomes and to 
make appropriate changes to improve the curriculum.”17 The new accreditation 
standards create increased expectation for collective faculty committee service 
in areas in which the faculty as a whole are not currently expert. Moreover, 
faculty, via committees, will need to work with the administration to create 
and implement assessment systems for retrieving the necessary data and 
THE BAR, AM. BAR. ASS’N, STATISTICS, CHANGE IN 1L MATRICULANTS BY SCHOOL—2015 VS 2014 
(at https://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_education/resources/statistics.html look 
under Longitudinal and Historical Data heading and download Excel database entitled 
Comparison of 2015 and 2014 1L Matriculants (2015_2014_1l_matriculatn_comparison.
authcheckdam.xlsx)) and SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, AM. BAR. 
ASS’N, STATISTICS, 2015 V. 2016 CHANGE IN 1L ENROLLMENT (at https://www.americanbar.
org/groups/legal_education/resources/statistics.html look under Current Year heading and 
download Excel database entitled 2015 v. 2016 Change in 1L Enrollment (2016_v_2015_1l_
matriculatns_authcheckdam.xlsx)) (last visited May 26, 2017). Fewer fi rst-year students 
enrolled in ABA-accredited schools in 2015 and 2016 than at any time before 1974. Moreover, 
no one anticipates returning to the admissions landscape of the 1990s and early 2000s.
14. William D. Henderson, A Blueprint for Change, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 461, 479–90 (2013) (discussing 
changing global market for lawyers and the impact on legal education). Professor Richard 
Susskind has also written about the changing nature of legal markets. See, e.g., RICHARD 
SUSSKIND, THE END OF LAWYERS?: RETHINKING THE NATURE OF LEGAL SERVICES 6, 9–11, 28–33 
(2010). See generally RICHARD SUSSKIND, TOMORROW’S LAWYERS: AN INTRODUCTION TO YOUR 
FUTURE (2013): William D. Henderson & Rachel M. Zahorsky, Paradigm Shift, A.B.A. J., July 
2011, at 40.
15. See, e.g., ABA STANDARDS, supra note 12, Standards 201(a), at 9; 315; at 23; 404(a), at 28.
16. Id. at Standard 315, at 23.
17. Id.
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information to comply with the revised standards, without impinging on 
academic freedom.18
The likely increase in committee service work is occurring at a time of 
shrinking full-time tenure or tenure-equivalent faculty hires, i.e., in the faculty 
who possess the privileges, duties, and rights of faculty governance.19 All of 
higher education is experiencing shrinkage of tenure-track faculty,20 and law 
schools are not immune to this phenomenon.21 Law schools are taking a hard 
look at faculty numbers and costs as they attempt to manage their budget 
challenges in an era of declining admissions and escalating demands.22 Some 
reductions in faculty have happened more quietly than others.23 However, 
current trends suggest that nationwide, and certainly in many individual 
schools, there will be fewer full-time faculty24 and more institutional work for 
those faculty members.
18. See Mary A. Lynch, An Evaluation of Ten Concerns About Using Outcomes in Legal Education, 38 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 976, 990 (2012) (noting faculty concerns that outcome measures will 
lead to loss of academic freedom by dictating what should be taught and how it should be 
evaluated). 
19. Faculty governance responsibilities vary among schools, but at all schools, full-time doctrinal 
and clinical faculty have the rights, privileges, and responsibilities of faculty governance. 
ABA STANDARDS, supra note 12, Standard 405 (c), at 29; Interpretation 405–8, at 30 (“A law 
school shall aff ord to full-time clinical faculty members participation in faculty meetings, 
committees and other aspects of law school governance in a manner reasonably similar to 
other full-time faculty members.”).
20. For a discussion of the decline in tenure-track faculty generally, see Katie J. Hogan, 
Superserviceable Feminism, in OVER TEN MILLION SERVED, supra note 2, at 55, 57; Katie J. Hogan 
& Michelle A. Massé, Introduction, IN OVER TEN MILLION SERVED, supra note 2, at 1. 
21. Paul Caron, Law Schools Have Shed 1,460 Full-Time Faculty (16.1%) Since 2010, TAXPROF BLOG (Jan. 
17, 2017), http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2017/01/law-schools-have-shed-1460-
full-time-faculty-161-since-2010.html [https://perma.cc/4UN3-YDB2] (noting that data 
compiled by Matt Leichter from ABA-required reports indicates 16.1% fewer full-time law 
faculty members in 2016 than in 2010, with 149 schools reporting reductions and twenty 
schools reporting losing more than twenty faculty members).
22. Paul Caron, Deans Respond to TaxProf Blog Posts on Faculty Layoff s, TAXPROF BLOG (Mar. 26, 
2014), http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2014/03/deans-respond.html [https://
perma.cc/BN95-9AF2] (quoting then-AALS president Dan Rodriguez “[t]hat law schools 
are looking to manage their costs by taking close looks at their faculty labor force seems 
entirely sensible.”).
23. Debra Cassens Weiss, Law Schools Cope with Declining Enrollment by Quietly Cutting Faculty, ABA 
J. (July 16, 2013, 12:02 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/law_schools_
cope_with_declining_enrollment_by_quietly_cutting_faculty/ [https://perma.cc/
R2RC-DCGX].
24. Matt Leichter, Which Law Schools Are Shedding Full-Time Faculty? (2014 Edition), THE LAST GEN X 
AM. (Dec. 18, 2014), https://lawschooltuitionbubble.wordpress.com/2014/12/18/which-law-
schools-are-shedding-full-time-faculty-2014-edition/ [https://perma.cc/FRV9-9P92] (“Since 
last year, the number of fall full-time instructors at all law schools fell by 8 percent; the 
cumulative decline since 2010 has been 11 percent, so much of what’s going on happened just 
before this academic year.”); Debra Cassens Weiss, Law School Faculty Numbers Shrink 11 Percent 
Since 2010; Which Schools Shed the Most Full-Timers?, ABA J. (Dec. 22, 2014, 6:15 AM), http://
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This new reality suggests that continued reliance on the same subset of 
faculty to perform institutional service, and the laissez-faire approach toward 
those who do not fully participate, may be an unsustainable model. There will 
simply be too much work and too few people to perform that work. Moreover, 
those who have been willing to step up in the past, if now overburdened by 
even more unrewarded work and with even less time for scholarly endeavors, 
may rationally decide to withdraw from participating in a system that penalizes 
them for their institutional citizenship.25 Thus, we suggest that to maintain a 
viable system of faculty governance, and to survive and thrive, law schools 
must fi nd ways to more equitably distribute service workloads. 
II. Confronting Committee Workload Disparities
A. Institutional Structures that Foster Committee Workload Disparities
Full-time faculty jobs require engagement in scholarship, teaching, and 
service. While service is a communal undertaking, scholarship and teaching 
have traditionally been solitary activities resulting in individual achievements.26 
Promotions, institutional rewards, and faculty members’ external reputations 
are largely based upon individual achievements, and particularly scholarly 
productivity rather than community engagement and service to the collective 
endeavor.27 Thus, for some, there is little incentive to participate in institution-
sustaining committee work. As long as colleagues do that work, the institution 
functions, and the individual faculty member can focus on work that reaps the 
most tangible rewards—i.e., scholarship. 
A rational faculty member, concerned with his or her own advancement, may 
choose to underperform on service work knowing that such underperformance 
www.abajournal.com/news/article/law_school_faculty_numbers_shrink_11_percent_
since_2010_which_schools_shed/?utm_source=maestro&utm_medium=email&utm_
campaign=daily_email [https://perma.cc/AK96-RYXP] (“Cooley currently has 49 faculty 
members, compared to 101 faculty members in 2010. Next on the list are George Washington, 
which has 34 fewer full-time faculty members in four years; Florida Coastal, which lost 33; 
Vermont, which lost 29; and Pacifi c McGeorge, which lost 27. Two law schools now have 
only eight full-time instructors. They are La Verne and Appalachian, whose faculties shrunk 
by 50 percent or more since 2010.”); Paul Campos, Law School Fires (or Otherwise Terminates with 
Extreme Prejudice) Nearly 60% of Its Faculty, LAW., GUNS & MONEY (Dec. 13, 2014), http://www.
lawyersgunsmoneyblog.com/2014/12/nations-largest-law-school-fi res-otherwise-terminates-
extreme-prejudice-nearly-60-faculty [https://perma.cc/ZM37-TV36].
25. See Norbert L. Kerr, Motivation Losses in Small Groups: A Social Dilemma Analysis, 45 J. PERSONALITY 
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 819 (1983) (discussing how some group members, refusing to be “suckers,” 
reduced their eff orts when others capable of contributing to the group did not do so); see also 
Schnake, supra note 9 (describing the “sucker eff ect”). 
26. Michael I. Meyerson, Law School Culture and the Lost Art of Collaboration: Why Don’t Law Professors 
Play Well with Others?, 93 NEB. L. REV. 547, 563 (2014) (“For most, though certainly not all, law 
professors, both teaching and scholarship are seen as solitary activities.”); see also, Donald E. 
Hull, The Hermeneutics of Service, in OVER TEN MILLION SERVED, supra note 2, at 219, 220
27. Id.
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is both likely to result in fewer or less work-intensive committee assignments28 
and that less committee work means more time to engage in career-enhancing 
work, or just more time to spend with friends and family. A rational dean may 
choose a managerial strategy in which the same worker bees29 are asked to 
perform the institutional labor because that strategy ensures the work will be 
done. 
One oft-heard comment is that the reason for the diff erence in institutional 
workload allocation is that diff erent people have diff erent strengths: Some 
excel at scholarship, while others excel at teaching, and others perform 
exceptional service. The common wisdom is that a smart dean plays to his 
or her faculty members’ strengths.30 For many deans, this means assigning 
light committee workloads to prolifi c scholars, avoiding assigning important 
committee work to those who do it poorly or resist strongly, and assigning the 
heavy-lifting committee work to those who get that work done. 
While prolifi c scholarship, great teaching,31 and institutional service all 
benefi t the institution, the model for distributing committee workloads has 
real-world consequences for individual faculty members. Time to engage in 
scholarship, and hence greater scholarly productivity, often results in a wide 
range of internal and external rewards: course releases, merit raises, national 
reputations, and additional job prospects.32 Those with signifi cant committee 
work responsibilities must either forgo time that otherwise would be spent on 
scholarship or work longer hours to achieve the same scholarly productivity 
levels as those colleagues with signifi cantly less committee work. For example, 
one study found that although both male and female undergraduate associate 
professors averaged a sixty-four-hour work week, institutional service work 
and other institutional commitments resulted in the women professors having 
220 fewer hours than their male counterparts to devote to scholarly endeavors 
during the academic year.33 That time diff erential can profoundly aff ect 
scholarly productivity.
28. See Rappaport, supra note 4, at n.43 (noting that those who underperform on committee 
work tend not to be asked to do time consuming important institutional labor because of 
a dean’s fear that assigning those people to do the work will result in the work not getting 
done).
29. Jon H. Sylvester & Anthony J. Pagano, It’s Not Just a Job, It’s an Adventure, 34 U. TOL. L. REV. 
165, 173 (2002) (describing those who deans can count on to do more than their fair share of 
the work without complaint and without keeping tabs as “worker bees”).
30. Id. at 176.
31. Because we focus expressly on faculty committee service workload, we consider issues 
concerning appropriate motivation of eff ective teaching to be beyond the scope of this 
article.
32. See Ronald H. Silverman, Weak Law Teaching, Adam Smith and a New Model of Merit Pay, 9 CORNELL 
J. L. & PUB POL’Y 267, 366–67 (2000) (describing some of the external and internal rewards 
available to productive scholars and noting that this reward structure often encourages 
scholarship over teaching).
33. Joya Misra et al., The Ivory Ceiling of Service Work, ACADEME, Jan–Feb. 2011, at 22, 24 (2011) 
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When prolifi c scholars get course releases or other workload releases as a 
reward and incentive to continue their scholarly pursuits, the cycle of rewards 
accompanying scholarly productivity becomes self-perpetuating. Thus, the 
oft-heard justifi cation for light-loading some faculty members on committee 
work because they are prolifi c scholars should be looked at in light of the 
real-world advantages and disadvantages this produces for individual faculty 
members and its impact on the institution. 
Eff orts to equalize workload distribution can provide institutions with 
valuable data to support or counter assumptions about whether the current 
model actually best serves the institution. For example, would more equitable 
committee workloads increase the scholarly productivity of the committee 
workhorses and thus enhance the institution’s overall reputation? If the faculty 
wants to sustain a meaningful system of self-governance, how many “prolifi c 
scholars” who perform little or no institutional service can the institution 
continue to aff ord in light of changing demands by consumers, employers, 
and accreditors? These questions may be best answered by experimenting 
with changes to the status quo.
The need to explore new ways of committee work accountability may be 
especially pressing if schools fi nd that many of their current institutional 
service worker bees are baby boomers. These stalwarts of institutional labor 
will begin to retire. Studies suggest that younger generations of workers 
believe work is less central to their lives, and value leisure time and work/
life balance more than their baby boomer counterparts.34 These generational 
diff erences may play a role in younger faculty members’ willingness to engage 
in unrecognized and unrewarded institutional service contributions, and they 
may be particularly reluctant to pick up the slack for colleagues who choose 
not to engage in committee work. 
With the likely increase in committee work, reduction in faculty available to 
do that work, and a new generation of faculty members potentially less willing 
to compensate for those who choose not to contribute, it is time to explore 
alternatives to the status quo. We suggest looking to social cognition literature 
for insights into how to create more equitable workload distributions and 
ensure a sustainable model of faculty governance in the changing landscape 
of legal education. 
B. Social Loafing: Causes, Consequences, and Remedies
Committees often consist of members who perform the lion’s share of the 
committee’s work and those who do little to contribute to the committee’s 
charged tasks. In this section, we discuss the social cognition theories 
(fi nding female associate undergraduate professors spent approximately 4.5 more hours per 
week on institutional service than their male counterparts). For a brief discussion of gender 
and racial inequities in service workload distribution, see infra note 69.
34. Jean M. Twenge, A Review of the Empirical Evidence on Generational Diff erences in Work Attitudes, 25 
J. BUS. PSYCHOL. 201, 204 (2010) (reviewing numerous empirical studies on generational 
diff erence in work attitudes).
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underlying the choice to let one’s colleagues carry the committee service 
workload, the negative consequences that fl ow from unchecked disparate 
group work contributions, and the lessons from social cognition theory on 
how to remedy inequitable service workloads.
Social cognition theorists coined the term “social loafi ng” to describe a 
reduction in eff ort when working on a joint product where one’s work cannot 
be judged separately from the collective product.35 Alternatively, when some 
believe their co-workers cannot be trusted to perform, they pick up the slack 
and do more than their fair share, resulting in what social cognition theorists 
call “social compensation.”36 Both social loafi ng and social compensation may 
cause resentment and frustration among those who believe that they carry 
more than their fair share of the committee workload.37 Perceptions that co-
workers are loafi ng may reduce the performance of other group members, thus 
resulting in a weaker group performance and product.38 Sustained workload 
inequities, along with a system that neither rewards extraordinary work nor 
penalizes substandard work, also may lead those who have traditionally done 
more than others to reduce the injustice of the situation by reducing their own 
level of eff ort to avoid being “suckers.”39
Fortunately, based on studies of student work groups and multiple 
nonacademic workplaces,40 the literature on social loafi ng off ers guidance on 
35. Steven J. Karau & Kipling D. Williams, Social Loafi ng: A Meta-Analytic Review and Theoretical 
Integration, 65 J. PERSONALITY & APPLIED PSYCHOL. 681, 681 (1993) [hereinafter Karau & 
Williams, Meta-Analysis].
36. See Kipling D. Williams & Steven J. Karau, Social Loafi ng and Social Compensation: The Eff ects 
of Expectations of Co-Worker Performance, 61 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 570, 571 (1991) 
(discussing social compensation theory).
37. Susan Durham, Janet Merritt & Jeanne Sorrell, Implementing a New Faculty Workload Formula, 
28 NURSING EDUC. PERSP. 184, 184 (2007) (noting that “perception of workload equity is a 
signifi cant variable related to faculty job satisfaction”).
38. Jasmine Tata, The Infl uence of Accounts on Perceived Social Loafi ng in Work Teams, 13 INT’L J. CONFLICT 
MGMT. 292, 293 (2002).
39. For studies discussing the “sucker eff ect,” i.e., the phenomenon in which an individual refuses 
to allow others to benefi t from his or her work and withdraws eff ort when he or she believes 
other capable group members consciously choose to withhold their eff ort, see Schnake, supra 
note 9; Kerr, supra note 25. 
40. We review the literature with the caveat that most social loafi ng studies in academia have 
occurred in context of student work groups rather than among adult workers, and virtually 
no studies exist on the unique aspects of social loafi ng in context of academic committees. 
See e.g., Susan M. Murphy et al., Understanding Social Loafi ng: The Role of Justice Perceptions and 
Exchange Relationships, 56 HUM. REL. 61, 63 (2003) (noting that “there are only a handful of 
studies examining social loafi ng in actual work groups”). Workplace studies include the 
following: Robert C. Liden et al., Social Loafi ng: A Field Investigation, 30 J. MGMT. 285 (2004) 
(looking at various aspects of social loafi ng in twenty-three work groups totaling 168 people 
in two diff erent workplaces); Jennifer M. George, Extrinsic and Intrinsic Origins of Perceived Social 
Loafi ng in Organizations, 35 ACAD. MGMT. J. 191 (1992) (examining the impact of task visibility 
and intrinsic value on workplace social loafi ng). The fi ndings of what motivates group work 
participation in the workplace largely mirror the fi ndings of what motivates participation in 
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how to mitigate the problem. We focus on two particular solutions found in this 
literature, reducing committee size and evaluating committee service, because 
these changes can be implemented via concrete action steps. Other solutions to 
social loafi ng, such as working on intrinsically meaningful tasks,41 feeling that 
one is making a unique, rather than redundant, contribution,42 working with 
highly respected co-workers,43 fulfi lling a sense of felt responsibility toward 
one’s co-workers or the organization,44 and working with highly cohesive 
groups45 rely more on intrinsic motivation and, while useful to keep in mind 
when making committee assignments, are more challenging to implement 
systematically.
1. Carefully Choose Committee Size
Virtually all faculty members are appointed to committees. Committee 
workload disparities often have little to do with committee assignments. 
Instead, workload inequities arise based upon who actually does the work 
within the committee, as well as who is asked to take leadership roles, either 
formally as chair or informally because a person is known to get the work 
done. 
Often, to spread the work and ensure a diversity of opinions, deans appoint 
relatively large faculty committees.46 In doing so, deans may be unwittingly 
student work groups. Thus, we believe that despite the diff erences between student work 
groups and work groups in institutions outside academia, the studies are salient when it 
comes to faculty committee workload distribution and performance. We suggest that studies 
of the eff ectiveness of the methods discussed here when it comes to faculty committee work 
would be useful and informative.
41. Karau & Williams, Meta-Analysis, supra note 35, at 686.
42. Stephen G. Harkins & Richard E. Petty, Eff ects of Task Diffi  culty and Task Uniqueness on Social 
Loafi ng, 43 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1214, 1227 (1982) (fi nding that motivation to 
participate in a group endeavor existed when individuals believed they were making a unique 
contribution, even if their contribution could not be severed from the group’s product). See 
also Karau & Williams, Meta-Analysis, supra note 35, at 701 (fi nding task meaningfulness and 
uniqueness can aff ect social loafi ng tendencies).
43. Karau & Williams, Meta-Analysis, supra note 35, at 701.
44. Hwee Hoon Tan & Min Li Tan, Organizational Citizenship Behavior and Social Loafi ng: The Role of 
Personality, Motives, and Contextual Factors, 142 J. PSYCHOL. 89, 94, 103 (2008) (discussing fi ndings 
that a sense of felt responsibility when group members depend on one another’s work to 
complete a project negatively correlates to social loafi ng).
45. Group cohesiveness has been defi ned as the level of affi  nity group members have toward one 
another, their desire to remain and function as part of the group, and the degree to which 
members value belonging to the group. Id. at 95. It has been found that group cohesiveness 
reduces social loafi ng. See, e.g., Steven J. Karau & Kipling D. Williams, The Eff ects of Group 
Cohesiveness on Social Loafi ng & Social Compensation, 1 GROUP DYNAMICS: THEORY, RES. & PRAC. 
156, 165 (1997).
46. Rena I. Steinzor & Alan D. Horstein, The Unplanned Obsolescence of American Legal Education, 75 
TEMP. L. REV. 447, 476 (2002) (noting that for key committees, deans appoint a wide array of 
faculty with diff ering experiences and viewpoints to avoid political fallout from those who 
feel their voice was not represented on the committee). 
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facilitating social loafi ng. Studies fi nd that the larger the group, the more 
likely social loafi ng will occur.47 Large groups enable some individuals to hide 
in the crowd, avoiding the negative consequences of slacking off , and, at the 
other end of the spectrum, some do not contribute because they get lost in the 
crowd and do not get credit for the individual eff ort they expend.48 Some feel a 
lack of accountability because withholding eff ort allows them to reap the same 
rewards as those who put in eff ort.49 Others may be unwilling to exert eff ort if 
they believe that their eff ort adds little to the group product—i.e., to the extent 
their input is dispensable in terms of the fi nal product, their motivation to 
participate decreases even when their contribution is made identifi able.50 It 
has even been suggested that “in some cases individuals may simply not be 
aware of the eff ort they are expending when part of a large group, and thus any 
reduction in eff ort may be unintentional.”51
One solution to social loafi ng is to appoint small committees. Small 
committees can increase feelings of individual accountability and make it 
easier to identify who is responsible for a positive outcome. Studies of team-
based learning suggest ideal work group size ranges from two to seven people, 
depending upon the project.52 However, no consensus exists about ideal 
workplace teams because workplace team size often depends on task and 
work environment. Additionally, concern about social loafi ng is just one of 
many considerations when forming work teams, such as faculty committees, 
because issues such as diversity of opinion, committee members’ individual 
expertise and interest in the project, the scope of the committee’s tasks, and 
other factors play a role in committee composition. Given these realities, if 
large committees are necessary, it may be useful to divide the work into tasks 
or projects that can be accomplished by smaller subcommittees. 
47. See, e.g., Karau & Williams, Meta-Analysis, supra note 35, at 697 (discussing studies showing 
that social loafi ng is more likely to occur in large groups); Liden et al., supra note 40, at 289 
(citing studies and suggesting reasons that large group size results in greater social loafi ng); 
Praveen Aggarwal & Connie L. O’Brien, Social Loafi ng on Group Projects: Structural Antecedents and 
Eff ect on Student Satisfaction, 30 J. MARKETING EDUC. 255, 260 (2008) (fi nding bigger groups 
“created conditions that were more conducive to social loafi ng”).
48. Bibb Latané et al., Many Hands Make Light the Work: The Causes and Consequences of Social Loafi ng, 37 
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 822, 830 (1979); Karau & Williams, Meta-Analysis, supra note 
35, at 683.
49. Liden et al., supra note 40, at 289.
50. Karau & Williams, Meta-Analysis, supra note 35, at 683. 
51. Liden et al., supra note 40, at 289. 
52. See L. Dee Fink, Beyond Small Groups: Harnessing the Extraordinary Power of Learning Teams, in TEAM- 
BASED LEARNING: A TRANSFORMATIVE USE OF SMALL GROUPS 3, 15 (Larry Michaelsen et al. 
eds., 2004) (noting that when it comes to cooperative and team-based learning “groups of 
8 or more tend to be ineffi  cient and ineff ective”); Laura Helle et al., Project-Based Learning 
in Post-Secondary Education—Theory, Practice and Rubber Sling Shots, 51 HIGHER EDUC. 287, 301 
(2006) (reviewing descriptive and analytical literature and suggesting that for project-based 
learning, group sizes of two to fi ve generally work well).
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2. Evaluate Committee Work
While small committees may help mitigate social loafi ng, small committees 
may not always be viable, and even within those committees some faculty 
members still may end up doing the lion’s share of the work given the dynamics 
of the committee or the nature of the work. Thus, we suggest faculties and 
deans develop concrete ways to evaluate committee work.
Why evaluate? A concrete evaluative process indicates that committee work 
matters, and the evaluative process itself sets behavioral norms. Evaluating 
committee work performance signals a shift from the current laissez-faire 
attitude toward committee work contributions. As one study noted, evaluation 
puts behaviors in a team context, focuses attention on behaviors relevant 
to eff ective performance, communicates certain behaviors are valued and 
important, and motivates change by visibly demonstrating discrepancies 
between behaviors and standards.53
What would a committee work evaluation look like? The answer to that 
question is a decision best left to individual faculties. However, to help 
faculties envision what such an evaluation might encompass, we provide a 
sample committee work contribution rubric [see Appendix A].
Another signifi cant question is: Who completes the evaluative rubric? 
Again, this question is best answered according to a particular law school’s 
culture and circumstance. Committee members could self-assess, using a 
rubric such as that suggested in Appendix A, with committee chair input or 
review. Alternatively, in institutions where chairs wield persuasion, authority, 
and gravitas, committee chairs could be asked to complete the evaluation 
with an opportunity for the committee member to comment. A more radical, 
potentially more accurate, and admittedly more complex suggestion is that 
schools use a committee work rubric as the basis for a peer-evaluation model.54
53. Dominick et al., supra note 11, at 515.
54. Peer evaluations are used in other workplaces as part of a 360-degree review. A 360-degree 
review involves multiple evaluators, including supervisor, peer, subordinate, and customer, 
along with a self-evaluation. Frederick P. Morgeson et al., Coming Full Circle: Using Research 
and Practice to Address 27 Questions About 360-Degree Feedback Programs, 57 CONSULTING PSYCHOL. 
J. PRACTICE & RES. 196, 196 (2005). Peer evaluations often are an important part of the 
360-degree review process. See, e.g., Maury A. Peiperl, Best Practice, Getting 360° Feedback Right, 
HARV. BUS. REV., Jan. 2011, at 142, 144 (discussing how to engage employees in eff ective peer 
evaluation as part of a 360-degree review). Studies have found that peer evaluations reduce 
social loafi ng. See, e.g., Greg L. Stewart et al., Peer-Based Control in Self-Managing Teams: Linking 
Rational and Normative Infl uence with Individual and Group Performance, 97 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 
435, 444 (2012) (fi nding workplace peer evaluations improved both individual and group 
performance); Charles M. Brooks & Janice L. Ammons, Free Riding in Group Projects and the 
Eff ects of Timing, Frequency, and Specifi city of Criteria in Peer Assessments, 78 J. EDUC. FOR BUS. 268, 271 
(2003) (fi nding that peer assessments used for both developmental and evaluative purposes 
reduced the free-rider problem when the evaluations provided specifi c feedback and were 
conducted early in the project and several times during that project); Vanessa Urch Druskat 
& Steven B. Wolff , Eff ects and Timing of Developmental Peer Appraisals in Self-Managing Work Groups, 
84 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 58, 71 (1999) (fi nding peer appraisals can have a positive impact on 
self-managed work groups); Dominick et al., supra note 11, at 512–13 (fi nding that the peer 
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Even though the precise content and mechanism of committee work 
evaluations may be up for debate, it seems clear that assessing faculty 
contributions is useful. The literature makes clear that using a feedback 
instrument that contains behavioral items and expectations sends a message 
that performance should meet the prescribed standards and provides 
opportunities to learn about, and refl ect upon, one’s own behaviors in 
relation to those standards.55 Evaluations exert normative controls because of 
people’s desire for belonging, a desire that motivates both compliance with 
and internalization of group standards.56 A rubric such as the one provided 
in Appendix A sets up clear standards and expectations that individuals who 
care about their colleagues’ good opinion will want to meet.57 The evaluations 
also provide the dean and committee chairs with documented information 
for dialogue with traditional committee service shirkers—especially if a dean 
incorporates the evaluations into the formal year-end evaluations. For all 
these reasons, an evaluative process hopefully deepens the pool of citizens 
from which to assign work. However, whether the process actually changes the 
existing culture largely depends upon faculties’ willingness to engage in the 
process and deans’ use of information from the evaluations.
As with any change to longtime practice in a culture such as academia,58 
schools considering evaluating committee work and thus creating an 
accountability system for institutional service work must grapple with resistance 
to change and resistance to accountability structures. They also must address 
concerns about human behaviors when it comes to both evaluating and being 
evaluations improved performance as measured by objective expert ratings). In an academic 
setting, peer review of committee work contributions raises complex issues such as potential 
disruption of workplace camaraderie and morale and concerns about the validity of the 
process because of potential friendship bias or unwillingness to identify noncontributors, 
especially if those noncontributors will be voting on tenure or promotion. Those concerns 
would need to be addressed by faculties who seek to engage in peer review evaluations of 
committee work contributions.
55. Dominick et al., supra note 11, at 515.
56. Stewart et al., supra note 54, at 436. 
57. See Brice Corgnet, Peer Evaluations and Team Performance: When Friends Do Worse than Strangers, 
50 ECON. INQUIRY 171, 172 (2012) (noting that some studies suggest that “the use of peer 
evaluations, by focusing the attention of team partners on each other’s [sic] contribution, 
may increase peer pressure and reduce free-riding behaviors in teams.”). We speculate 
that evaluations may also protect junior faculty from senior faculty who tend to “dump” 
committee work on untenured junior colleagues. An evaluative process may make this kind 
of conduct more transparent and make it more diffi  cult to turn a blind eye to that kind of 
behavior.
58. AM. BAR ASS’N TASK FORCE ON THE FUTURE OF LEGAL EDUC., REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
15 (2014) http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_
responsibility/report_and_recommendations_of_aba_task_force.authcheckdam.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/U9MV-MVZ8] (noting that there is “a large-scale law faculty culture 
in the United States as well as sub-cultures particular to individual schools” and that 
“[c]ultures tend to be stable and not easily changed”).
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evaluated.59 To the extent faculty are resistant to accountability structures, 
allowing for self-evaluation, with some level of input from committee chairs, 
may be the way to balance concerns about heavy-handedness on the part of 
the administration with the need to institute some form of committee work 
contribution accountability. 
Finally, while an evaluative process has the potential to improve committee 
workload performance by setting norms and expectations, evaluations of 
committee work contributions may have a limited impact if a dean is not 
willing to use the evaluations to reward outstanding citizens60 and to develop 
a plan of improvement for those who are not meeting their service obligations. 
For some deans, a willingness to engage in meaningful service work evaluation 
may hinge upon whether faculty members really want the dean to reward 
outstanding service and discipline those who repeatedly refuse to contribute 
to the collective endeavor. For others, it may rest upon diff erent calculations. 
For example, is a dean willing to address in a constructive manner substandard 
service performance, especially if the faculty member is an outstanding scholar 
or teacher? Thus, to some extent, whether a concrete assessment of committee 
work contributions eff ectuates change may be a function of both culture and 
leadership.
3. Reward Outstanding Committee Work with a Release
from Future Committee Work
While service work theoretically is part of every faculty member’s job 
description and thus theoretically compensated, reality does not match theory. 
As discussed earlier, the current system incentivizes scholarly productivity. 
Faculty members may lose their jobs for failure to publish and often get 
59. To the extent the evaluation involves input from committee chairs or involves other forms of 
peer evaluation, faculties might benefi t from training on how to give and receive feedback, 
given that many faculty members have had no formal training in what makes feedback eff ective, 
and even fewer have had training in how to receive feedback. For an excellent book on how to 
receive feedback, see DOUGLAS STONE & SHEILA HEEN, THANKS FOR THE FEEDBACK: THE SCIENCE 
AND ART OF RECEIVING FEEDBACK WELL (2014). If peer evaluation is used, faculty education 
should also include education about the role unconscious biases may play in performance 
assessment. See, e.g., Rebecca D. Gill et al., Are Judicial Performance Evaluations Fair to Women and 
Minorities? A Cautionary Tale from Clark County, Nevada, 45 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 731 (2011) (reporting 
study results that suggest “objective” judicial performance evaluation surveys may refl ect 
unconscious gender and racial biases). A recent study of teaching evaluations found implicit 
bias based on gender on ostensibly objective characteristics such as “promptness.” Colleen 





60. The rational theory of motivation suggests that when rewards are attached to performance, 
to the extent one recognizes that an evaluation will help determine those rewards, individuals 
are motivated to “pursue goals endorsed by whoever determines the rewards and to omit 
behaviors that detract from obtaining those rewards.” Stewart et al., supra note 54, at 436.
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salary increases and course releases for well-placed and prolifi c publication.61 
Some schools also reward outstanding teaching, although generally not to the 
same extent as outstanding scholarship. Currently, at many law schools, no 
signifi cant tangible reward or remuneration exists for outstanding service,62 
nor is one penalized for poor or nonexistent service. In this section, we suggest 
deans change the paradigm. Instead of “rewarding” outstanding service work 
with additional service work, we propose that deans reward institutional 
committee worker bees by giving them less service work via committee work 
release time.63
Given tight budgets and other institutional and university structures, 
meaningful fi nancial remuneration may not be a viable reward for outstanding 
institutional service. However, deans could reward those who take on the lion’s 
share of committee work with more time for scholarship so that they can reap 
the institutional rewards that frequently hinge upon scholarly productivity.64 
The traditional way to create time is to award course releases. Teaching in 
law schools involves not only the hours spent in the classroom, but prep 
time, keeping abreast of new case law, and working with individual students 
or groups of students during offi  ce hours. Faculty members who are given 
a reduced course load are able to increase the time devoted to scholarship. 
However, a course release may not be viable given curricular needs and in light 
61. Shelley M. Park, Research, Teaching and Service: Why Shouldn’t Women’s Work Count?, 67 J. HIGHER 
EDUC. 46, 48 (1996) (noting the rewards in academia go to productive scholars, not those 
who perform institutional service). See also Benjamin Baez, Race-Related Service and Faculty of 
Color: Conceptualizing Critical Agency in Academe, 39 HIGHER EDUC. 363, 365 (2000) (noting that 
service is expected but not valued and, in fact, the promotion and tenure processes punish 
faculty members who do so much service that it hinders their publishing and teaching 
eff ectiveness); Silverman, supra note 32, at 366–67 (describing some of the external and 
internal rewards available to productive scholars and noting that this reward structure often 
promotes scholarship over teaching). 
62. Some exceptions to this general rule exist. For example, Albany Law School grants a Faculty 
Excellence in Service award annually at graduation, an award accompanied by a small 
fi nancial remuneration. 
63. Deans could consider other rewards such as fi nancial remuneration, or even creative rewards 
such as prime parking spots. However, those rewards fail to address the equity issues created 
by the time diff erentials required of those asked to perform signifi cant institutional service. 
We note that service encompasses a wide range of categories, including (a) law school and 
university committee work and faculty governance service; (b) service to students; (c) law 
school or university project development and management; (d) administrative service as 
deans and program directors; (e) community service and outreach; and (f) professional 
service and leadership. See Clausen, supra note 8, at 238. While administrative, community, 
and professional service are all valuable, that service work can have career-enhancing eff ects. 
On the other hand, internal institutional service work goes largely unrewarded, and can 
actually have a detrimental impact on one’s career. See Guarino & Borden, supra note 3. Thus, 
to remedy some of the inequities discussed throughout the article, we suggest an assessment 
structure that focuses on faculty committee service and rewarding extraordinary service with 
the luxury of time.
64. See supra note 27 (discussing rewards that accompany scholarly productivity).
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of the current and anticipated reduction in full-time faculty discussed earlier.65 
Moreover, and in some situations, if one has been assigned a heavy committee 
burden that involves numerous tasks and requires signifi cant attention, a 
course release may not provide the blocks of time that facilitate scholarship. 
Thus we suggest a low-cost reward for extraordinary service: committee 
release time.66 A reward structure for outstanding service work, such as a year 
with no committee assignments, potentially could motivate some faculty 
members who do a moderate amount of work to more fully engage in service 
work, and it may help those who do the lion’s share of the work continue to stay 
 engaged rather than withdraw from what they perceive to be an inequitable 
system.67
We acknowledge that committee work release presents deans with a dilemma: 
If they relieve their best workers of committee work, will the work get done? 
That is the issue that underlies the common problem that the “reward for 
committee work well done is more committee work.” Deans go to the people 
they know will get the work done because of the potential consequences of 
assigning the work to those who don’t do it. We believe that institutions, 
and deans, should not sweep under the carpet the ethical issues raised by a 
system that places largely unrewarded service work burdens upon some so 
that others have more free time to engage in the scholarly work that garners 
tangible benefi ts both inside and outside a given institution. As we discussed 
in section II, supra, rewarding prolifi c scholars with more time for scholarship, 
while “rewarding” strong committee workers with more committee work and 
thus less time for scholarship, creates real-world inequities.68 Ignoring the 
unfairness of the current structure is particularly problematic when that model 
raises gender and racial equity issues.69
65. See supra Part I (discussing reduction in full-time faculty members).
66. In recognition of years of extraordinary service work, one of us was given a year with no law 
school committee assignments. That free time enabled her to write two articles and a book 
chapter—a level of scholarly productivity that was impossible when she was chairing two 
signifi cant law school committees and a national professional organization committee.
67. See supra text accompanying note 39 (discussing the sucker eff ect).
68. See supra Part IIA.
69. Gender inequity in service workloads has been documented. See, e.g., Misra et al., supra note 
33, at 24 (fi nding female associate undergraduate professors spent approximately 4.5 more 
hours per week on institutional service than their male counterparts); Nancy Levit, Keeping 
Feminism in Its Place: Sex Segregation and the Domestication of Female Academics, 49 KAN. L. REV. 775. 
784–90 (2001) (discussing observational and anecdotal information about disparate service 
workloads among male and female law faculty); Guarino & Borden, supra note 3 (fi nding 
that women faculty members spend substantially more time on internal service work than 
their male counterparts and thus have less time available to engage in work that reaps more 
substantial tangible rewards). So, too, racial inequities in committee service workloads are a 
real problem. See, e.g., Baez, supra note 61, at 366–67 (2000) (discussing studies demonstrating 
heavy institutional service demands placed upon faculty of color). Intersectionality issues 
of race and gender result in even greater service workload inequities. Laura E. Hirshfi eld & 
Tiff any D. Joseph, “We Need a Woman, We Need a Black Woman”: Gender, Race and Identity Taxation 
in the Academy, 24 GENDER & EDUC. 213 (2012) (discussing studies of service overloads on 
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While this article recommends potential rewards for extraordinary 
contributions, we would be remiss if we did not suggest that deans consider 
penalties for a pattern of substandard service work contributions. In today’s 
world, deans cannot ignore the fact that some faculty members do not engage 
in institutional committee work, nor can they continue to count on the worker 
bees to get all the work done. Thus, the idea of committee work rewards goes 
hand in hand with creating committee work participation accountability 
structures, such as institutionalized committee work evaluations. These 
evaluations create behavioral norms and hopefully voluntarily enhance 
faculty committee work participation. However, they also provide deans with 
documentation that enables them to reward outstanding citizens and confront 
those who consistently fail to carry their fair share of the workload. 
Conclusion
Evidence suggests there will be an increase in faculty committee work 
demands and fewer people available to do that work. In an era of enhanced 
accreditation burdens and market force restructuring70 that require more 
committee work, faculties and deans must address committee workload 
inequities if they wish to maintain a robust system of faculty self-governance 
and avoid institutional stagnation. This article presents ideas that serve as a 
starting point for exploring how schools might preserve a robust system of 
faculty governance while also addressing the inequitable workload allocations 
and reward systems that exist at many institutions.
women, people of color, and particularly women of color). It is beyond the scope of this 
article to discuss the gender and racial inequities in service work allocations. While we hope 
that some proposals in this article lessen overall faculty committee workload disparities, 
we recognize that to fully counter gender and racial service workload inequities, additional 
issues must be confronted and addressed.
70. See supra Part I (discussing changes in legal education that likely will result in the need for 
additional institutional service).
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Appendix A—Committee Work Contribution Rubric—
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What is the single most valuable contribution you made to your committee?
What is the single most important thing you could do to more eff ectively help 
your committee?
*The original author of this rubric cannot be determined. SMET refers to Science, Math, 
Engineering, and Technology. The rubric is available at https://perma.cc/XSN4-GHVF.
